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CASENOTE

The "Soft" Existing Legal Protection of
Software and the Preemption of State
Shrink-Wrap License Enforcement Acts
I.

INTRODUCTION

The computer software' development and manufacturing industry
has grown to serve a major market in recent times. 2 The developers
and manufacturers of this software have sought to protect their
extensive investments in development through legal means such as
patent, copyright and trade secret laws.' Although these laws do offer
some protection of the developers' proprietary interest in the software,
the software industry perceives these protective devices as inadequate
to protect their software from unauthorized copying. 4 Software de1. The Copyright Act defines a computer program as a set of instructions
used in a computer to bring about a certain result. 17 U.S.C. section 101 (1982). In
the computer industry the term computer program is synonymous with computer
software. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065
(N.D. II. 1979) aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (1980). Hardware consists of the actual
computer, while the software is the programming that runs this hardware. See Triangle
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1979). See also 1
D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW (1987) (explaining the sources and functions of software

and hardware) [hereinafter

BENDER].

2. In 1984 worldwide software sales amounted to $25.3 billion, of which 51%
was marketed in the United States. The U.S. was responsible for developing 70% of
the worldwide software total. In 1987 worldwide software sales were estimated at $93
billion, of which 47% was marketed in the U.S. The U.S. developed 74% of the
world total. J. McPhee, Computer Industry Trends, 1987 Comp. L. UPDATE (Comp.
L. Ass'n 1987) (presenting figures reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce
Office of Computers and Business Equipment).
3. 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 3.01.

4. J.

SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW

24 (1983) (traditional

means of protecting software are inadequate); Davidson, "Box-Top" Software
Licenses, 41 BENCH & BAR OF MINNESOTA 9, 9 (March 1984) (software publishers'
interests are not adequately protected by existing bodies of law). The legal system
has not kept pace with technological developments in software. See J. SOMA, supra,
at 21 (explaining the need to adapt traditional law to computer technology).
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5
velopers have thus turned to extra-intellectual-property means to
protect their investments in the software such as the use of technology
to prevent the copying of software as well as the use of shrink wrap
license agreements 6 which impose promises on the software purchasers
not to copy the program. The effectiveness of technology alone to
prevent copying is limited. 7 The use of shrink-wrap licenses on massmarketed software8 appears to be the final hope for the protection of

the developers' interests. Two states sought to protect the software

developers' interests further by enacting statutes that gave enforcement
and legitimization to these shrink-wrap license agreements . The first
case to bring into question the enforceability of state software license

enforcement acts (SLEA) ° was Vault Corporationv. Quaid Software
Limited." In that case, a federal court in Louisiana held both the
12
adhesion
shrink-wrap license agreement unenforceable as a contract of
13 unenforceable as preempted by federal
and the Louisiana SLEA

copyright law.14 Thus, in its initial test in the courts, a means of
proprietary protection of vast potential was eliminated and the soft5. See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 3.01 (extralegal means of protection including
of technology to impede copying and the offering of commercial incentives
use
the
to enhance the value of taking a license may be used alone or in conjunction with
legal means). The term "extra-intellectual-property" will be used in this note instead
of the term "extra-legal" used by Bender. The terms are intended to be defined as
any means of preventing the unauthorized copying of software other than patent,
copyright or trade secret law.
6. The term is also referred to as "tear open", "box top" or "blister"
contracts. A shrink-wrap contract is one in which the terms are displayed beneath
the cellophane wrapper, or shrink-wrap of a container, such terms deemed accepted
when the vendee opens the package. See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.02(4).
7. The extent of software piracy evidences the failure of technology to impede
copying. See supra note 4.
8. Shrink-wrap license agreements are not employed when custom-developed
software is sold because of the ability and opportunity to actually negotiate a license
agreement.
9. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1961-66 (West 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
801-08 (1986).
para.
29,
10. 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.02(4) n.1.
11. 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987).
12. Vault v. Quaid, 655 F. Supp. 750, 761 (E.D. La. 1987). The Louisiana
Supreme Court defined an adhesion contract as "a standard contract ... prepared
by a party of superior bargaining power for adherence or rejection of the weaker
party .

.

. which will sometimes raise a question as to whether or not the weaker

party actually consented to the terms." Golz v. Children's Bureau of New Orleans,
Inc. 326 So.2d 865, 869 (La. 1976).
13. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1961-66 (West 1987).
14. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 763.
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ware industry can now only rely upon the inadequate intellectual
property means of protection.
This casenote will first present an overview of the traditional
intellectual property means of protecting proprietary interests in software: patent, copyright and trade secret protection. An explanation
of each means will be given and the advantages and disadvantages of
each will follow. The newer extra-intellectual-property means of shrinkwrap license agreements and state software license enforcement acts
will then be examined, including the potential advantages and disadvantages of each. Next, the preemption of state law by the federal
intellectual property system will be examined, including both the
constitutional preemption doctrine and the statutory copyright preemption doctrine. An analysis of Vault v. Quaidand a brief conclusion
will follow.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

PATENT PROTECTION

The developer of a computer program may look to the patent
laws 5 for protection of his proprietary interests. The patent laws are
based on the United States Constitutional provision that Congress
shall have the power "to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."'16 Congress
exercised this power by codifying and enacting patent statutes in Title
35 of the United States Code. 17 These patent statutes contain no
special provisions for computer programs;' 8 therefore software is
subject to the same patentability standards that all other inventions
must meet.
A patentee is granted the right to exclude others from making,
using or selling the invention covered by the patent.' 9 This right to
exclude lasts for seventeen years after the date the patent is granted. 20
The right to exclude use is effective not only against those who copy
15. For a detailed statement of the law of patents, see P. ROSENBERG, PATENT
(1984 Revision); Costas & Harris, Safeguarding Intellectual and
Business Property-II, 35 CONN. B.J. 569 (1962). See also I BENDER, supra note 1,
secs. 3A.01-3A.07 (discussing patent protection of computer software).
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982).
18. See id.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982).
20. Id. at § 154.
LAW FUNDAMENTALS
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the invention, but also against non-copiers such as subsequent independent creators of the same invention. 2' In this sense, the monopoly
granted by a patent is quite broad.
23
22
The basic requirements for patentability are utility, novelty,
and nonobviousness. 24 Computer related inventions have had no special difficulty meeting these tests. 25 New applications for patents must
also concern proper subject matter. The patent statutes set forth the
subject matter of patents as any "process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter ' 26 and an invention must fall within one of
these four categories for a patent to issue. The software creator27will
most often categorize his invention as a new process or method.
However, two major exceptions to the "process" category exist
that are relevant to patentability of computer software: the mathematical formula 28 and mental steps 29 exceptions. A mathematical
formula is not patentable because it is said to exist in nature and is
therefore not invented. 0 A patent will also not be granted on a
method if an essential feature of the method consists of mental
participation. The rationale is that a mental step is non-technological
and not part of the useful arts, but rather an intellectual concept and
not subject to exclusive use by a patent grant.'
The application of these doctrines to computer software has been
subject to changing judicial interpretation and is still developing. 2 In
21. Id. at § 271(a).
22. Id. at § 101.
23. Id. at § 102.
24. Id. at § 103.
25. See Hyde, Legal Protection of Computer Software, 59 CONN. B.J. 298,
301 (1985).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
27. The term "process" is synonymous with "method." See 35 U.S.C. §
100(b). A process is "a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing." Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S.
780, 788 (1876).
28. LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852).
29. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
30. "A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive; these cannot be patented as no one can claim in either of them as an exclusive
right." LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
31. See Hyde, supra note 25, at 302-03 (mental steps including those that can
be performed by a person with pencil and paper are not within the statutory meaning
of process).

32. In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), the inventor claimed a method
for converting data into pure binary numerals. The Court stated: "The mathematical
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a recent case, Diamond v. Diehr,33 the Supreme Court considered the
patentability of a process for curing rubber which included the use of
a mathematical formula and a digital computer.3 4 In finding the
process patentable subject matter the Court stated: "Our conclusion
regarding respondents' claims is not altered by the fact that in several
steps of the process a mathematical equation and programmed digital
computer are used."3 According to Diehr, mathematical formula and
algorithms may be part of a claimed invention so long as the formula
or algorithm is not preempted by the patent.
A two step test has developed from a line of decisions 36 that
applied the various Supreme Court holdings. The first step is to
determine whether the claim directly or indirectly recites an algorithm.
If it does not, the issue of a patent is not barred by § 101. If it does
recite an algorithm, the issue is not barred if the algorithm is "applied
in any manner to physical elements or process steps,' provided that
its application is circumscribed by more than a field of use limitation
or non-essential post-solution activity. Thus, if the claim would be
'otherwise statutory,' . . . albeit inoperative or less useful without the
algorithm, the claim likewise presents statutory subject matter when
the algorithm is included." 37 Thus the decision in Diehr is viewed by
some to be a breakthrough in the availability of patent law to
3s
computer related inventions.
There are several advantages to patent protection of software.
The protection is broad in the sense that the patent grantee has the
right to exclude use of the underlying algorithm, rather than the
particular form of expression.39 Thus patent protection is desirable
formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection
with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below to grant a patent
is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself." Id. at 71-72.
In Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), the Supreme Court denied the issue of
a patent. The existence of uses for the formula other than in the process claimed as
well as the post-solution activity were held not to distinguish the case from Gottschalk
v. Benson. For an in-depth discussion of the judicial history of computer software
patentability, see 1 BENDER, supra note 1, §§ 3A.01-3A.03(2).
33. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
34. Id.

35. Id. at 185.
36. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
37. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
38. See Hyde, supra note 25, at 305.
39. See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 3A.07(1).
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when the algorithm is capable of implementation in different expressions. Patent protection is broad also in the sense that independent
origination of the patented software is no defense to an infringement
suit.4 Because the scope of the protection is so great, the need to
litigate the actual copying is eliminated. 4' The term of protectionseventeen years 4 2-is of adequately long duration since it exceeds the
lifetime of a typical program. 43 Since the patent laws do not require
secrecy of the invention, the developer need not attempt to maintain
secrecy and may produce and distribute the product widely without
jeopardizing any patent infringement claims. 44
Many disadvantages exist in patent law as applied to computer
software. A major disadvantage is that although the useful life of a
typical program is relatively short, frequently five years or less, the
patent application process averages about 2 1/2 years. 41 Thus the
program, if patented, is unprotected for a significant portion of its
useful life. Additionally, the cost of attaining a patent is relatively
high" while many software developers are relatively small and lacking
in resources.
Another major disadvantage is the unavailability of patent protection to some programs. Many software products do not meet the
various standards of patentability. Also, the value of a particular
program may not be rewarded by the patent system. That is, the
patent system requires novelty for the issue of a patent, yet some
programs are valuable not for their novelty, but because of the
tremendous amount of labor involved in their development. 47 The
uncertainty and instability involved in patent law regarding computer
software also poses problems as the software developer cannot ascertain what the law is or will be. 4

40. Id.
41. Id.

42. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
43. See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 3A.07(1).
44. Id.
45. Id. at § 3A.07(2).
46. The applicant must pay the P.T.O. at least $3,200 to obtain a patent and
have it remain in force for the seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1982). For individuals
and small businesses the fee is reduced. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.9 (1987), 13 C.F.R. secs.
121.3-18 (1987). It is unusual for attorney's fees today to be less than $2,000 to
secure a patent. See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 3A.07(2).
47. "[Tlhe patent system rewards inspiration, whereas many programs are
rendered valuable because of perspiration." 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 3A.07(2).
48. Id.
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TRADE SECRET PROTECTION

The law of trade secrets, unlike patents and copyrights, is derived
from the common law of the states. 49 The definition of a trade secret
cited with approval in most jurisdictions 0 appears in the Restatement
(First) of Torts. It states:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business,
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine
or other device, or a list of customers .... Generally it relates
to the production of goods, as, for example, a machine or
formula for the production of an article.5
Although the Restatement definition does not explicitly mention computer programs, courts have generally held programs to fall within
this definition.5 2 Two requirements for a trade secret which are almost
inseparable are secrecy53 and novelty.14 One who discloses or uses
another's trade secret is liable if he discovered the secret by improper
means. 5 A person will not be liable if he discovers another's trade
secret by proper means, which include reverse engineering,5 6 discovery
under a license from the owner of the trade secret,57 and observation
49. For a detailed statement of the law of trade secrets see R. MaoRsI, TRADE
SECRETS (1985).
50. See R. MiLCIRm, TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (1985).
51. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
52. E.g., Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802
(1975), rev'd on other grounds, 555 F.2d 1382 (1977) (programs clearly fall within

the definition of formula, patterns, compilations of information or technical knowledge which were used in IBM's business); University Computing Co. v. LykesYoungstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974).

53. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (secrecy,
in the context of trade secrets, implies at least minimal novelty).
54. The requirement of secrecy and novelty for a trade secret is clearly less
than that for a patent to issue. Id. at 476.
55. See 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) (in general, improper means are
those which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and
reasonable conduct).
56. See LA. REv. STAT. Ann. § 51:1431 comment (a) (West 1987) (reverse
engineering is starting with the known product which was acquired by fair and honest
means, and working backward to find the method by which it was developed).
57. Id.
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of the product in public use or on public display.58 It is now well
settled that federal intellectual property law does not preempt state
trade secret law even though the trade secret is patentable. 59
There are several advantages of trade secret laws to developers
of software. There is substantial certainty that computer programs
are appropriate subject matter for protection under the trade secret
laws. 60 Trade secrets encompass a wide range of subject matter. The
program, data bases, intermediate materials such as flow charts, and
ancillary material such as documentation are all protectable. 61 Trade
secret law protects both the underlying idea and the particular expression of the idea. 62 Trade secret protection, like copyright protection, is available from creation, whereas patent application periods
average about two years. 63 A final advantage of trade secret law is
the potentially lengthy duration of the protection. The protection may
last many years, so long as the information remains secret. 64
Just as trade secret protection has the potential for long duration
it may also be subject to immediate loss due to discovery of the
information by proper means. A trade secret may be lost through
independent invention by others. 65 The remedy for trade secret misappropriation may be limited since litigation against the one who
wrongfully made the information public may be the only course of
action available. 6 Also, to avail himself of the protection of trade
secret law, the proprietor must take affirmative steps to keep the
information secret. Although there is a limit to the extent that the
proprietor must guard his secrets, 67 a trade secret maintenance program can be expensive. 8 A final disadvantage of trade secret law is
its obvious shortcomings with respect to goods embodying trade
secrets that enjoy wide proliferation. The probability of disclosure of
the trade secret, by inadvertent or intentional means, increases with
the degree of its dissemination. 69
58. Id.
59. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-93 (1974).

60. See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.01[5][aI.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

65. Id.at § 4A.01[51[b1.
66. Id.
67. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 166 U.S.P.Q.
421 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024, reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 967 (1971).

68. See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.0114][b].
69. Id.
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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

Federal copyright law 70 is based upon the same constitutional
grant of power to Congress as the federal patent laws. 7' Copyright
law protects an author's particular expression of an idea from copying,
72
not the idea itself.
The Copyright Act of 197671 is the main federal statutory protection for original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of
expression. 74 These works of authorship include, but are not limited
to, literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomime and
choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptured works; motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; and sound recordings. 75 Although at first glance computer programs do not seem to fit neatly
within one of ,he enumerated categories protected by the Act, computer programs are regarded as an extension of the subject matter
Congress already intended to protect. 76 The great weight of authority
indicates that computer programs are entitled to protection under
copyright law. 77 Computer programs are properly considered within
the category of literary works to the extent that they incorporate
7
authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas. 1
70. For a detailed statement of the law of copyright, see M.
ON COPYRIGHT

(1987) (Vols. 1-4).

NBME1R,

NDOIER

71. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
72. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (a
newspaper article is protectable under copyright law but the news itself is not). See
also H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ArmN. NEws 5659, 5670.
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs
should extend protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the
programmer, rather than merely to the 'writing' expressing his ideas. Section
102(b) [of 17 U.S.C.] is intended, among other things, to make clear that
the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in
a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in
the program are not within the scope of the copyright law.
Id.
73. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
74. Id. at § 102(a).
75. Id. at § 102(a)(1-7).
76. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADwmN. NEws 5659.
77. See Brignoli v. Balch Hardy and Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1204
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elec., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1477
(D. Nev. 1983); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 779
(C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
78. See supra note 77.
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The Copyright Act affords the owner of a copyright the exclusive
rights to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works79
based upon the copyrighted work, to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease or lending.10 The copyright owner is also given the

exclusive right to authorize other persons to use the copyrighted work

in the above listed ways. 8 However, the Copyright Act lists several
limitations on these exclusive rights that allow non-authors to reproduce the copyrighted work for the purposes of criticism, comment,

news reporting, teaching,
infringing upon the rights
An author may avail
inexpensively.85 Copyright

scholarship 2 and archival use83 without
of the copyright holder.8 4
himself of copyright protection easily and
protection with respect to computer soft-

ware is of extremely long duration since the duration of protection is

the author's lifetime plus fifty years86 while the effective life of typical
computer software is not more than five years.
A major disadvantage of copyright protection is that infringement

is difficult to police, especially for widely disseminated works.87
Additionally, the method or process of which the program is an
expression is not protected by copyright law.88 Thus the copyright
holder has no course of action against one who uses a different mode
79. "A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works
in which a work may be recast, transferred, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent
an original work of authorship is a 'derivative work'." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). To
constitute a derivative work "the infringing work must incorporate in some form a
portion of the copyrighted work." Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). The infringing work must also be a
"substantially similar" copy of the original work. Id.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
81. Id.
82. Id. at § 107.
83. Id. at § 108. See also id. at § 117 (limitation of rights specifically regarding
computer programs).
84. See also 17 U.S.C. § 109 (lawful owner of a copy may sell or dispose of
the copy without infringing); 17 U.S.C. § 110 (certain displays and performances of
a copyrighted work do not constitute infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 111 (certain
secondary transmissions of the copyrighted work do not constitute infringement); 17
U.S.C. § 112 (certain recordings or copies made for purposes of later transmission
do not constitute infringement).
85. 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 4.09(1) (application fee is $10 and compliance
with application formalities is quick and easy).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
87. 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 4.09(2).
88. See supra note 72.
...
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of expressing the same method or process. Finally, the extent to which
a subsequent work must copy the original work before it is deemed
an infringement is an uncertain and often difficult test to meet.8 9
D.

EXTRA-INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MEANS OF PROTECITON

1. Shrink- Wrap License Agreements

In the face of the perceived inadequacies of legal protection, the
software industry adopted extra-intellectual property means of protecting its proprietary interests in software. 9o An extra-intellectualproeprty device increasingly being used in relatively inexpensive massmarketed software packages is the shrink-wrap contract. The terms
of the "contract" are visibly displayed beneath the clear plastic heatsealed wrapper around the software package.?' The vendee is deemed

to have accepted the terms of the displayed agreement when he opens

the plastic shrink-wrap or tears open the box. 92 The acceptance is

premised on the fact that provisions of the contract usually state in
bold letters that by opening the wrapper or box the purchaser is
consenting to the contractual restrictions on the purchaser's rights. 93

89. See infra text accompanying notes 175 and 185.
90. See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 3.01 (legal protection includes patent,
copyright and trade secret protection while extralegal protection includes the use of
technology to impede copying and the use of license agreements that limit vendee's
rights to copy the software; these extralegal means may be used alone or in
conjunction with legal means). See supra note 5.
91. See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.02(4).
92. Id.
93. Id. Shrink-wrap agreements bring under scrutiny whether or not the traditional elements of contract formation are present. It is questionable whether the
courts will view the simple act of opening a plastic wrapper as an informed consensual
acceptance when a purchaser may genuinely assume that the printing under the
wrapper is merely instructions or advertising. If this is the case, courts may hold that
a simple sale occurred when the purchaser paid the distributor. 1 BENDER, supra note
1, § 4A.02(4). Also, there is an "established line of cases which are adverse to
adhesion or standard form contracts in consumer transactions." Id. In Vault the
court held that, absent the state shrink-wrap law, the shrink-wrap agreement is
unenforceable as one of adhesion. Vault v. Quaid, 655 F. Supp. 750, 761 (E.D. La.
1987).
However, there are cases which approve of incorporating printed terms located
on goods for sale into the contract. See Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 35 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 91, 97 (Callahan 1982). (printing on herbicide label that invited the
purchaser to repudiate if unwilling to accept the terms); Bickett v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 629, 636 (Callahan 1972) (printing on a tag on a bag of
seed expressly made acceptance of seed conditional on acceptance of disclaimer of
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The printed agreement also states that if the purchaser does not wish
to agree to such terms, a full refund for the software will be made if
the package is returned unopened. 94 The agreement terms usually give
the purchaser a fully paid non-exclusive right to use the program
contained in the device as often and as many times as the purchaser
may want over an indefinite period. 9 In this sense, the addition of a
shrink-wrap agreement onto the software package changes the nature
of the transaction from an outright sale of goods between a retailer
and a purchaser into a license agreement. 96 Since the transaction is a
lease, the vendor retains a title to the program and attempts to restrict,
through the terms of the agreement, the vendee's rights to copy, rent
out, modify, reverse engineer or disassemble the program. 97 Thus,
shrink-wrap contracts attempt to supplement available federal copyright protection by utilizing a contractual cause of action whenever
98
the terms of the contract are breached.
2. Software License Enforcement Acts
Having observed the potential for courts holding shrink-wrap
contracts unenforceable on traditional contractual bases, two state
legislatures have enacted software license enforcement acts (SLEAs). 99
These statutes attempt to legitimize and make enforceable shrinkwrap contracts that might otherwise be held unenforceable by the
courts.100 The preamble to the Illinois statute states: "An act to
protect against the unauthorized use, duplication, and distribution of
computer software."'' These statutes delineate the manner in which
the agreement must be written and displayed before the statute makes
the agreement enforceable. 0 2 The statutes generally require the written
notice to be affixed to or packaged with the software, 03 that the
warranty provisions).
For a discussion of software shrink-wrap contracts and their enforceability under
the Uniform Commercial Code, see Note, The Protection of Computer Software
Through Shrink-Wrap License Agreements, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1985).
94. See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.02(4).
95. Id.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

1987).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.02(4).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 29, para. 801 (1985).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 29, para. 803 (1985); LA.

103. ILL. Rav.

(West 1987).

STAT.

REv. STAT.

ch. 29, para. 803(1) (1985); LA. REv.

§ 51:1963 (West

STAT.

§ 51:1963(1)
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notice be readily understandable and clearly conspicuous, 01 4 that the
actions on the part of the purchaser that will constitute acceptance be
clearly stated, 0 and that the notice state that the purchaser may
return the unopened software package within a reasonable time if he
does not accept and agree to the terms of the agreement. 0 6
The statutes then state which provisions, if included on the
attached agreement, will be held enforceable by the statute if the
acceptance of the contract has been properly manifested.10 7 The
statutes allow provisions for the retention of title by the vendor of
the software. 08 If retention of title is provided for and thus a license
agreement is created, other enforceable provisions include those for
the limitation or prohibition of copying, 09 for the limitation or
prohibition of disassembly and reverse engineering,110 and for the
limitation or prohibition of the purchaser's right to transfer the
software copy."' The statute does not require the vendor of the
software to have a copyright on the program." 2
The protection afforded by a valid shrink-wrap license agreement
is broader in scope than that of copyright or trade secret protection.
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 803(4), (5)(1985); LA. REv. STAT. § 51:1963(1),
(2) (West 1987).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 803(1) (1985); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1963(3)
(West 1987).
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 803(4) (1985); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1963(4)
(West 1987).
The Illinois Act further requires that no additional agreements have been entered
into between the parties regarding the use of the software, and that the software
must not have been developed according to the acquirer's specifications. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 29, para. 803(7)-(8) (1985). The former provision does not allow the shrinkwrap agreement to override a prior agreement. The latter provision recognizes that
when software is custom-made to the acquirer's specifications there is a much better
opportunity to negotiate terms of a lease or sale and the Act should therefore not
apply.
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804 (1986); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964
(West 1987).
108. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804(1) (1985); LA. REv. STAT. § 51:1964(2)
(West 1987).
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804(2)(1985); LA. REv. STAT. § 51:1964(2)
(West 1987).
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804(3) (1985); LA. REv. STAT. § 51:1964(3)
(West 1987).
111. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804(4) (1985); LA. REv. STAT. § 51:1964(4)
(West 1987).
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 801-08 (1985) (makes no mention of requirement of a copyright on the software for the Act to be enforceable); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. secs. 51:1961-66 (West 1987) (makes no mention of requirement of a copyright
on the software for the Act to be enforceable).
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The software vendor may stipulate restrictions on the use, copying
and reverse engineering of the software in excess of the restrictions
imposed by copyright or trade secret law. For example, under trade
secret law reverse engineering of a lawfully acquired computer software disk is allowable, but reverse engineering of a disk can be
restricted by inclusion of a clause in the shrink-wrap lease agreement
that states the user will not disassemble or reverse engineer the
program." 3 The protection is also broader than that afforded by
copyright law. Copyright law allows making copies of works for
archival or back-up purposes 1 4 while all copying-including copying
for archival or back-up purposes-may be prohibited by inclusion of
such a restrictive clause in the license agreement."' These broader
rights conferred on the vendor are viewed as advantages by the
software industry.
The effect of software license restrictions on copying and reverse
engineering, coupled with the use of technology and protective software on the diskette,'1 6 is perhaps the major advantage of the license
agreement. By prohibiting the decompiling and reverse engineering of
computer software-including the protective software-other software
developers are effectively precluded from developing programs that
the buying public will use to copy the programs containing protective
software. Since these other developers cannot copy or reverse engineer
the protective software they cannot design software that will override
the protective software and allow the copying of the underlying,
protected program. Thus the buying public is prevented from copying
programs containing protective software since there would be no
software available to override the protective software. Software developers using shrink-wrap agreements would thus only need to police
the software developers who are openly marketing programs that
override protective software." 7 The disadvantage, mentioned below,

113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804(3) (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
51:1964(3) (West 1987).

§

114. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
115. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804(2) (1956); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
51:1964(2) (West 1987).
116. 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 3.01 (technology may be used to render
misappropriation more difficult). See Vault v. Quaid, 655 F. Supp. 750, 753 (E.D.
La. 1987) (Vault Corp. manufactures diskettes containing computer programs that
prevent the copying of the underlying program).
117. See, e.g., Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 753. Vault is an example of a protective
software developer suing another software developer that mass-marketed programs
to override protective software. See infra notes 169-217 and accompanying text.
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of the vendors inability to police individual use is therefore mitigated

to a great extent.

Another advantage of shrink-wrap license agreements is the general ease with which the protection is attained. The software vendor

must merely meet the requirements of the applicable SLEA with
respect to the printing of the agreement on the software package in

order for protection to be afforded."' Protection is thus inexpensive.

The effective date of protection occurs when the vendee accepts the

terms of the agreement by opening the shrink-wrap. Thus the protection begins immediately contrary to protection afforded by a patent." 9
The effective term of the protection is adequate since the promise on

the part of the vendee is for as long as he uses the program.

The disadvantages of shrink-wrap licenses fall mainly on the
consumer. The buyer's rights may be fewer under a shrink-wrap
license than under an otherwise ordinary sale of goods protected only
by copyright law. The lease agreement may restrict the buyer from
copying the program for archival or back-up use. 20 Copyright law
allows the buyer to copy for archival or back-up use without infringing
the copyright.' 2 ' A shrink-wrap lease agreement may also limit or
prohibit the transfer of the disk by the lessee. 122 A buyer, according
to copyright law, however, is allowed to transfer his copy without
infringing the copyright. 123 Thus the resale value of the software to
the consumer is limited, if not eliminated, by a shrink-wrap license. 24
118. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 803 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:1963 (West 1987).
119. Application process for attaining patent protection averages about 2 1/2
years after developing the product. 1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 3A.07[2]. Thus, a
product developer would have to wait about 2 1/2 years to sell his product in order
for the product to be protected by a patent. By utilizing a shrink-wrap license, a
software developer does not wait; he merely markets the software package with the
properly attached license agreement. The protection is then immediate upon the
buyer's assent to the license agreement (i.e. upon opening the software package or
using the software).
120. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804(2) (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:1964(2) (West 1987) (allowing terms that prohibit lessee from copying for any
purpose).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
122. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804(4) (1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
51:1964(4) (West 1987).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982) (lawful owner of a copy may sell or dispose of the
copy without infringing copyright).
124. The disadvantage of a buyer attaining fewer rights due to a shrink-wrap
license agreement would be mitigated of course if the vendor lowers the price of the
software in accordance with the shrinking bundle of rights granted to the buyer. See
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A final disadvantage of SLEA's is that they may clash with the
objectives of the federal intellectual property system and, therefore,
as discussed below, may be preempted by federal law.
E.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

There are two ways in which state laws can be held unenforceable
1 25
due to their preemption by federal law: on federal statutory grounds
and on constitutional grounds. 126 This note will first discuss the federal
statutory preemption doctrine and then the constitutional preemption
doctrine.
1. Federal Statutory Preemption
The Copyright Act establishes preemption with respect to state
laws. Section 301(a) of the Act provides:
[A]l legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103,...
are governed exclusively by this title. Therefore, no person is
such work
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in 1any
27
state.
any
of
statute
or
law
under the common
The next portion of the Act-section 301(b)(3)-states conversely:
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any state with respect to
activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106.128
Thus, in order for a state law to avoid preemption by section
301, that state law must contain an element not equivalent to the
rights granted a copyright holder under section 106. The rights listed
in section 106 are the right:
1 BENDER, supra note 1, § 301 (vendor may offer commercial incentives to enhance
the value of taking a license).
125. This note will not discuss the constitutionality of the statutory preemption
doctrine.
126. See note 159 and accompanying text.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
128. Id. at § 301(b)(3).
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1) to produce the copyrighted work in copies...;
2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
3) to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;
4) in the case of literary . . . works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
5) in the case of literary
righted work publicly. 29

...

works, to display the copy-

The legislative history of section 301 indicates it was "intended
to be stated in the clearest and most unequivocal language possible,
so as to foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its [Congress']
unqualified intention that Congress shall act preemptively, and to
avoid the development of any vague borderline areas between State
and Federal protection." 1 10 It may be doubted whether this Congressional objective has been achieved.' 3'
The legislative history of section 301 discusses the rights that are
"different in nature" from the exclusively granted rights of copyright
and therefore not preempted by the Copyright Act. 3 2 Rights of
privacy, trade secrets, the general laws of defamation and fraud were
not intended to be preempted but "would remain unaffected as long
as the cause of action contains elements, such as invasion of personal
rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in
kind from copyright infringement."3 Scrutinizing this passage of
legislative history, it seems apparent that not all of the elements of
the state cause of action need be different in kind from those of
section 106 of the Copyright Act. The language indicates that only
one of the elements of the unaffected cause of action must be different
in kind from copyright to prevent the preemption of the action by
129. Id. at § 106.
130. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CONG. & ADhN. NEws 5659, 5746.
131. 1 NIMMR, NIMMER ON COPY IGHT § 1.01(B) (1987).
132. H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1975 U.S.
CONG. & ADmN. NEWS 5659, 5745-49.
133. Id. at 5748.
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the federal Copyright Act. 3 4 The legislative history goes on to state

that "[nlothing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties to
contract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract." '
These passages are consistent since a breach of contract claim contains
an element different in kind from a copyright infringement claim: a

have
promise on the part of the breaching party. Several decisions
36
held contracts not preempted by federal copyright law.

134. Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Bdcstg. Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.
1982), is illustrative of the additional element contained in a cause of action which
mandates the action not be preempted by federal law. The case involved the
misappropriation and broadcast of a compilation of Charlie Chaplin films. The
compilation, developed and copyrighted by the plaintiff Roy Export, required considerable effort to develop, of which the defendant was aware. The defendant did
not merely broadcast the works but exhibited the additional element of bad faith, an
element not required for copyright infringement actions to lie. The court stated that
"the additional decision not only to use the film clips, but to use them in a distinct
and original form whose commercial potential, as CBS knew, reflected someone else's
effort and creativity, precludes any thought of good faith." Id. at 1106. In BurmaBibas, Inc., v. Excelled Leather Coat Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the
court followed Roy and granted punitive damages by holding the state unfair
competition statute was not preempted by federal law. Id. at 1217. The allegations
of unfairness and an unjustifiable attempt by the defendants to profit from the
plaintiff's expenditure of time, labor and talent were sufficiently different from the
allegations made in support of a trademark infringement cause of action. Id. at 1218.
Another illustrative case is Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 613 F.
Supp. 1052 (D.C.N.Y. 1985). The court stated that, "[wiere Gemveto's claim
predicated solely upon Cooper's having copied plaintiff's jewelry designs, the claim
perhaps would be preempted by federal law. However, it is not merely product
simulation but predatory practices that are the basis of the injunctive relief granted
herein." Id. at 1064 (footnote omitted). The additional element in that case that
prevented the preemption by federal law was the intent on the part of the defendant,
since intent is not an element of either copyright, patent, or trademark infringement
actions.
Note, however, that other courts disagree that intent is an additional element.
See Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (other elements such as awareness or intent, which alter the actions'scope but
not its nature, will not save the action from preemption under section 301). See also
note 138 and accompanying text.
135. H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADNaN. NEws 5659, 5745-9.
136. See Werlin v. Reader's Digest Assoc., 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(breach of implied-in-law or quasi-contractual claim not preempted because the rights
protected are qualitatively different from copyright); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F.
Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (claims of breach of express or implied contracts are
not preempted); Brignoli v. Balch, Hardy and Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (breach of contract claims, trade secret claims and claims for breach
of confidentiality not preempted).
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This test has been referred to as the "extra element" test. 3 7 The
court in Meyer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, Ltd."'3 adeptly discussed
the test. The court stated:
A right which is "equivalent to copyright" is one which is
infringed by the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display ....If under state law the act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display . . . will in itself
infringe the state created right, then such right is preempted.
But if other elements are required, in addition to or instead
of, the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or
display, in order to constitute a state created cause of action,
then the right does not lie "within the general scope of
copyright" and there is no preemption. 139
The court qualified this statement by saying that the "extra
element, however, must be one which changes the nature of the action
so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim. Elements such as awareness or intent, which alter the action's
scope but not its nature, will not save it from preemption under
section 301.1 40 Thus mere recitation of another element that does not
change the nature of the action will not keep the action from being
preempted by federal copyright law. 14'

137. Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (1985).
138. 601 F. Supp. 1523 (1985).
139. Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1535 (quoting 1 NIMMER, supra note 129, § 1.01(b)).
140. Meyer, 601 F. Supp. at 1535.
141. See generally 1 NIMMER, supra note 129, § 1.01 (Section 301 has been
applied by various courts to preempt a wide range of actions). See also Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (conversion and tortious interference with contractual relations), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Warner
Bros. Inc. v. American Bdcstg. Co., Inc., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983) (unfair
competition); Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 819 (1984) (crime of dealing in stolen property); Mention v. Gessell, 714 F.2d
87 (9th Cir. 1983) (common law copyright and misappropriation); Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v. Granger Collection, 61 N.Y.2d 517, 474 N.Y.S. 2d 964, 463
N.E.2d 365 (1984) (misappropriation).
However, courts have found that state law claims similar to those listed abovesome even sharing the same name-in fact survive § 301 preemption. See, e.g., Oddo
v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 1984) (conversion and breach of fiduciary duty);
United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Down Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 785 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1981) (conversion); D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (unfair competition/misappropriation).
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2. ConstitutionalPreemption
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution mandates that federal
law is supreme over state law.1 42 The clause thus provides another
mechanism for holding state law preempted by federal law. 43 The
first cases to decide upon the constitutional preemption of state laws
by federal intellectual property laws were Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel' 4 and its companion case Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc.145 (hereinafter Sears - Compco). In Sears, the Court held an
Illinois unfair competition law unenforceable because it was preempted by federal law. The Court stated that, "Uj]ust as a State
cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot,
under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition,
give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal
patent laws." '
In Goldstein v. California'47 the Supreme Court qualified the
Sears-Compco decision by stating that the states retain concurrent
power to grant copyright protection so long as such protection does
not conflict with federal law.148 The Goldstein decision indicated that
only those categories of writings which Congress has brought within
the scope of the federal statute were ineligible for state law protection. 49 The holding in Goldstein is quite similar to section 301(b)(1)
which excludes from federal preemption "subject matter that does
not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103. . . ."150 The opinion did not expressly set out
the additional requirements set out in section 301(b)(3) of the Copyright Act; namely, that there is no preemption as to "activities
violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106."'M However, this may have been implied in Gold142. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
143. The Supremacy Clause was the only means of preemption before the 1976
Copyright Act was enacted. Section 301(b) states that the preemption doctrine stated
in the Act is only enforceable in causes of action arising after January 1, 1978. 17

U.S.C. § 301(a)(b) (2) (1982).

144. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
145. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
146. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
147. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).

148. Id. at 560-61.
149. Id. at 559.

150. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(l) (1982).
151. Id. at § 301(b)(3).
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stein.5 2 Thus section 301(b)(3) of the Copyright Act has been viewed
by one court as a codification of the constitutional preemption
doctrine expressed in Goldstein to the extent that state laws containing
elements not equivalent to elements of copyright do not conflict with
53
federal copyright law.

However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Aronson v. Quick

Point Pencil Co. 5 4 seems contrary to the view that section 301 is a

complete codification of the constitutional preemption doctrine. Aronson involved a contract between the inventor of a keyholder and a
manufacturer.' The plaintiff manufacturer sought declaratory judgment that the royalty contract with the defendant inventor was
unenforceable. 5 6 The issue before the Court was whether such a
contract-which is made enforceable by state law-is preempted by
federal patent law. 57 The Court explained the constitutional preemption doctrine as follows: "Commercial agreements traditionally are
the domain of state law. State law is not displaced merely because
the contract relates to intellectual property ... ; the states are free to

regulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not
inconsistent with federal law.""58 Contrary to the extra-element test
as applied to contracts, the Court did not hold the contract valid per
se merely because it was a contract, but stated it was enforceable only
if it was not inconsistent with federal law. Because the constitutional
preemption doctrine does not hold contracts enforceable per se and
the statutory preemption doctrine of section 301 does - because the
promise element involved in a contract claim is not equivalent to
elements of copyright - section 301 should not be viewed as a complete
codification of the constitutional preemption doctrine. The further
step of determining whether the state law conflicts with the objectives
of federal law must also be taken.5 9
The Court in Aronson went on to examine whether the contract
in question clashed with the objectives of the federal patent system.
Those objectives were listed as follows:
supra note 129, § 1.01(B) n.22.
153. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
("[I]t seems likely that Section 301 merely codified Goldstein ...." (quoting NMMER,
supra note 129, § 1.01[B] n.22.)), rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (1981).
152. NIMMER,

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

440 U.S. 257 (1979).
Id. at 259.
Id.at 260.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 262.

159. This further step can be viewed either as an entirely distinct doctrine from
the Copyright Act's section 301 preemption analysis or intended by the legislature to
be implied within the § 301 preemption analysis.
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"First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further
innovation and permit the public to practice the invention
once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for
patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain
remain there for the free use of the public."' 6
The Court held that the agreement between the inventor, Aronson, and the manufacturer, Quick Point, was "not inconsistent with
to contract with manufacany of these aims."' 6' Permitting inventors
62
invent.'
to
incentive
an
provides
turers
The Court also stated that enforcing the contract did not remove
any idea from the public domain. 63 In fact, the manufacture and sale
of the keyholder under the terms of the contract actually facilitated
the wide dissemination of the design into the public domain. 16 The
Court further stated that enforcement of the agreement would not
discourage anyone from seeking a patent. 65 Finally, the Court implied
that no monopoly was granted by enforcing the agreement since it
does not prevent anyone from copying the keyholder design. "It
merely requires Quick Point to pay the consideration which it promised in return for the use of a novel device which enabled it to preempt
the market." 66 Thus the Court held the contract between the inventor
and manufacturer to be not inconsistent with the federal patent system
67
and enforced the contract.'
Aronson mandates that a contract does not escape preemption
by federal intellectual property law merely because it is a contract.
Rather, the contract must be examined in light of the supreme
objectives of the federal intellectual property system. If enforcement
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
Id.
Id.
Id.at 263.
Id.

165. Id.

166. Id.at 264.
167. The Supreme Court used a similar method to decide Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). At issue was the preemption of state trade secret
protection by operation of federal patent law. Id. at 472. The court examined whether
the attainment of the objectives of federal patent law-to promote the progress of
science and useful arts-was hindered by the enforcement of state trade secret law.
Id. at 480. The court held the state law was not preempted since the objectives of
patent law would not be furthered if there were no state trade secret protection, and
also because the objectives of patent law are not hindered by the existence of state
trade secret law. Id. at 482-93.
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of the contract terms would clash with these objectives, the contract
68
should not be enforced.1
III.
A.

VAULT V. QUAID

FACTS

Vault Corporation v. Quaid Software Limited'6 9 is the first case
to scrutinize shrink-wrap contracts and state shrink-wrap statutes. 170
Vault Corporation was in the business of manufacturing data security
software designed to prevent the copying of software programs. 7' Its
primary product, PROLOK, was a security program on an otherwise
blank diskette. Vault sold these diskettes to other software producers
who placed their own software on the diskette along with the security
software. The security software on the PROLOK diskette then inhibited copying of the other software producer's programs.' 72 The security
programs on the PROLOK diskettes were copyrighted by Vault 73 and
the software packages were sold with a shrink-wrap license agreement
attached.
Quaid Software Limited was also a software developer. It manufactured a software program called CopyWrite, which allowed the
purchaser to make copies of programs that were contained on other
floppy diskettes. A segment of the CopyWrite program called
RAMKEY allowed a user to make copies of programs on PROLOK
diskettes. 174 The RAMKEY program contained thirty characters that
168. The preemption of state law by federal intellectual property law is very
controversial. Different courts have reached different results regarding the preemption
of quite similar state statutes. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 515 So. 2d 220
(1987), involved the preemption of a Florida statute that prohibited the copying of
boat hulls by a direct molding process. The court stated that "[ejither an article in
the public domain is fully protected by patent or it may be copied in any manner."
Id. at 222. The Florida Supreme Court held that the state law was preempted by the
federal patent laws.
However, a similar case, Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
seems directly contrary to Bonito. Interpart involved a California statute prohibiting
the duplication of manufactured items by a direct molding process. The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the statute was not preempted. The court
reasoned that the statute did not clash with the objectives of patent law since products
could still be duplicated but not by the particular method of direct molding.
169. Vault v. Quaid, 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987).
170. See I BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.02(4) n.31.
171. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 752.
172. Id. at 754.
173. Id. at 753.
174. Id. at 754.

554
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were similar to thirty characters of the PROLOK program. 75 Quaid
developed RAMKEY both by decompiling and disassembling the
PROLOK program as well as by utilizing software programs that
76
Copies
analyzed PROLOK without decompiling or disassembling.
of PROLOK protected software could be made without RAMKEY or
a similar product, but because of the PROLOK protective software
the backup copy would only operate when the original PROLOK
diskette was in either of the two disk drives of the computer. RAMKEY
enabled the user to copy a PROLOK protected program such that the
original was not required to use the copy. 177 Thus RAMKEY allowed
the user to make effective backup or archival copies of a PROLOK
protected program.
Vault sought permanent injunctive relief 178 as well as damages
from Quaid. Vault based its claim on several alternative causes of
action: copyright infringement, violation of the Louisiana Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, 179 and the Louisiana Software License Enforcement

Act. 180

B. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

1. The Court's Analysis of Vault's Copyright Infringement Claim
The court first examined Vault's claim that Quaid infringed upon
the copyright of the PROLOK program.'' Vault claimed that Quaid
infringed the copyright in three different ways.
First, Vault claimed that whenever an employee of Quaid loaded
a PROLOK diskette into a personal computer's random-access memory (RAM), 8 2 Quaid was making an unauthorized copy of PROLOK
175. Id. at 755.
176..Id. at 755 (the different versions of RAMKEY were developed each by
different means).
177. Id. at 755.
178. Id. at 752.
179. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1431-39 (West 1987).
180. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1961-1966 (West 1987).
181. Before this, however, the court first resolved the jurisdiction issue. Personal
jurisdiction was found based upon the Louisiana long-arm statute. LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3201(a), (b), (d) (West 1987). Contacts included the sale of CopyWrite in
Louisiana and Vault's claims of injury. Vault v. Quaid, 655 F. Supp. 750, 756 (E.D.
La. 1987).
182. While in the RAM, the computer makes a temporary copy of the program.
Any person who purchases a PROLOK disk must necessarily load the program into
RAM in order to utilize the program. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 758.
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in violation of the law of copyright. 83 The court stated that 17 U.S.C.
section 117(1) makes an exception when copying a program is an
essential step in the utilization of the program. Quaid therefore did
not infringe by loading PROLOK into RAM, an essential step in the
84
utilization of the PROLOK program.
Second, Vault asserted that CopyWrite was an unauthorized
derivative work of PROLOK in violation of Vault's copyright.'8 5 The
court held that RAMKEY is not substantially similar to PROLOK
and is therefore not a derivative work of PROLOK. Accordingly, the
court held there was no violation of 17 U.S.C. section 106(2).186
Third, Vault claimed Quaid contributorily infringed the copyright
to PROLOK since CopyWrite could be used by third persons to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted software placed on PROLOK
protected diskettes. 187 The court stated Vault lacked standing to assert
this claim, since it was the software developers who sold their programs, on PROLOK protected diskettes and not Vault whose copyrights were being infringed. 8 The court did say though, that even if
Vault did have standing to assert this claim, the claim would fail.
Since CopyWrite was capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses, such as making archival copies, the court found no contributory infringement on the part of Quaid. 89 The court thus disposed
of all of Vault's various claims of copyright infringement.190
2. The Court's Analysis of Vault's Trade Secrets Claim
The court then analyzed Vault's claim that Quaid violated Louisiana's Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 19' Vault contended that Quaid's
183. Id.

184. Id.

185. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
186. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 759.
187. Id. at 758. The Copyright Act does not expressly hold a party liable for
infringing acts committed by another. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984). However, "[t]he absence of such express language in the
copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity."
Id. at 435.
188. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 759.
189. Id. No contributory infringement occurs when the product is capable of
"commercially significant noninfringing uses." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). Noninfringing uses include those enumerated in the
Copyright Act §§ 107-12. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-12 (1982).
190. The decision in Vault is illustrative of why software vendors do not rely
merely upon copyright law but turn to extra-intellectual-property means to attempt
to protect their financial investment.
191. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1431-39 (West 1987). The court also decided which
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acts of reverse engineering of the PROLOK program were improper
means of ascertaining the information on the diskette. 92 However,
the statute defines "proper means" to include "[d]iscovery by 'reverse
engineering', that is, by starting with the known product and working
backward to find the method by which it was developed."' 193 The
acquisition of this "known product must of course, also be by a fair
and honest means, such as purchase of the item on the open market
for reverse engineering to be lawful."' 914 Since Quaid purchased the
PROLOK diskettes through the mail' 95 and the reverse engineering
and decompilation of PROLOK were not improper for purposes of
the court accordingly held
the Louisiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
96
that the state statute was not violated.
3. The Court's Analysis of Vault's Breach of Contract Claim
The final analysis left for the court was that regarding Vault's
breach of contract claim. Vault contended that the license agreement
was binding. They claimed that the lease agreement was written and
displayed as the Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act required
and that acceptance was manifested by Quaid as the Act requires.1' 9
The agreement contained a provisions that prohibited the vendee from
copying, translating, decompiling or disassembling the licensed software for any purpose without Vault's prior written consent. 9 Vault
claimed the subsequent reverse engineering and disassembly of the
PROLOK program by Quaid constituted a breach of the license
contract for which damages should be awarded. 199
a.

The Court's Adhesion Contract Analysis

The court began its analysis by stating the license agreement was
one of adhesion without citing case precedent or any applicable
statutes. 200 The shrink-wrap contract, the court held, is only enforcestate's law to apply. The court applied Louisiana law since the lease agreement
specified which state's (La.) law would govern even though the contract was deemed
one of adhesion. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 760.
192. Vault, 655 F. Supp..at 761.
193. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1431 comment (a)(2) (West 1987).
194. Id.
195. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 754.

196. Id. at 761.

197. Id. at 752.

198. Id. at 753.
199. Id. at 752.
200. Id. at 761.
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able if the Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act is a valid
and enforceable statute. 201 Since the court held the agreement on the
package was displayed in accordance with the terms of the Act, 2 2 the
court next considered the validity and enforceability of the Act.
b.

The Court's Statutory Preemption Analysis

The Vault court began its section 301 statutory preemption analysis
of the case by finding that two of the rights allocated in the lease
agreement that are enforceable under the state shrink-wrap law are
"equivalent" to the rights protected under the federal Copyright
Act. 20 3 The first "equivalent right" is the right of the vendor to
prohibit the vendee from copying "for any purpose." 2 4 The Copyright
Act allows the making of archival copies 2° of the software as well as
copies which are an essential step in the utilization of the program. 206
Therefore, the court concluded, the SLEA is in direct violation of the
Copyright Act and has granted even greater protection than the
27
Copyright Act. 0
The second "equivalent right" granted by the SLEA, the court
held, was the right conferred on the vendee to prohibit, through the
license agreement, "translating, reverse engineering, decompiling, disassembling, and/or creating derivative works based on the computer
software." 20 s The Copyright Act grants the copyright owner the
exclusive right to develop derivative works based on the original
work. 20 9 The right to prepare derivative works is an exclusive right
under the Copyright Act and, the court implied, the state cannot
grant the equivalent right. 210
The court did not expressly address the section 301(b)(3) exception
to preemption for state laws involving rights "not equivalent" to
those within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106. By implication, it follows that the court did not find any rights
granted by the SLEA to be "not equivalent" to those in section 106.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 762.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1964(2) (West 1987).
See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
Id. at § 117.
Vault v. Quaid, 655 F. Supp. 750, 762 (E.D. La. 1987).
Id. quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1964(3) (West 1987).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).

210. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 763, quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1987).
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The Court's Constitutional Preemption Analysis

The court moved to the constitutional preemption doctrine by
implying that the SLEA "clashes with the objectives" of federal
copyright legislation in two ways. 21' First, the SLEA creates a perpetual bar against the copying of a program licensed pursuant to its
provisions212 while the federal Copyright Act grants protection against
23
unauthorized copying only for the life of the author plus fifty years.
Second, the SLEA places no restrictions on the programs which may
be protected under its provisions, 2 4 while the Copyright Act protects
25
only "original works of authorship."
The court then implied in its conclusion that the Louisiana
Software Act is unenforceable because the Act is preempted by both
the constitutional preemption doctrine and the statutory preemption
doctrine of section 301 . 2 16 The court held that, since the contract is
unenforceable as one of adhesion, and since the Louisiana Software
License Enforcement Act gives no enforceability to the contract since
the Act is preempted by federal law, the contract is not enforceable.
21 7
Vault's breach of contract claim, the court stated, failed.
The court thus disposed of Vault's copyright infringement, trade
secret misappropriation, and breach of contract claims against Quaid.

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

2 18

STATUTORY PREEMPTION

Section 301 is that part of the Copyright Act statute dealing with
the federal preemption of state laws. Section 301(a) states that state
laws which grant rights equivalent to any of the exclusive rights of
copyright as specified in section 106 are preempted. The Vault court's
211. Id. at 763.

212. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1961-66 (West 1987) (no provision made for
the maximum duration of a shrink-wrap lease agreement).
213. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
214. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1962-63 (West 1987) (the only subject matter
requirement is that the program meet the loose definition of computer software stated
in § 1962).
215. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
216. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 763.
217. Id.
218. This note will not address the court's holdings with respect to the copyright
infringement claim or the trade secret misappropriation claim other than to assume
their correctness. This note will analyze the Vault court's holding regarding the breach
of contract claim, which includes the preemption issue.
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determination that the elements of section301(a) were met is not
disputed here. Two rights, as the court pointed out, granted by the
state statute were equivalent to those involved in copyright.2 1 9 The
first of these rights is the right to restrict the copying of the work,
which is equivalent to the section 106(a) copyright grant of the right
to reproduce the work. 220 The second equivalent right granted by the
SLEA is the right conferred on the vendee to prohibit, through the
license agreement, "translating, reverse engineering, decompiling, disassembling and/or creating derivative works based on the computer
software." 22' This right is equivalent to the right granted by section
106(2) to the copyright holder to exclusively develop derivative works
based on the original work. 222 Thus the elements of the main portion
of the preemption statute-section 301(a)-are met.
The court, however, did not expressly examine the second half
of the preemption statute, which deals with exceptions to preemption .223 Section 301(b)(3) exempts from preemption state laws involving
"activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106." 2 Thus the "extra element" test. discussed
above225 was not expressly considered by the court.
The SLEA contains an "extra element" that is not found in a
copyright infringement action. The SLEA deals with provisions of a
contract. Thus Vault's cause of action contained an element-a
promise on the part of Quaid not to copy or decompile the programqualitatively different from the elements of copyright infringement.
Therefore, Vault's cause of action survives the "extra element" test. 226
219. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 762.
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1982). The Vault court states the equivalent exclusive
right granted by copyright is that permitting the "making of archival copies from
copies of computer software and permits copying which is 'an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program."' Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 762, quoting 17
U.S.C. § 117 (1987). Thus the court did not say a right specified within § 106 was
granted by the state law, which is required by § 301(a). The language of § 301(a)
states that the right must be within the "general scope of copyright as specified by §
106," so the court implied that this broad language has been met.
221. LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 1964(3) (West 1987).
222. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
223. The court, however, did reprint the portion of the act dealing with
exceptions to preemption. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 762.
224. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1982).
225. See text accompanying note 137.
226. Vault's cause of action survives the face of the language of section 301(b)(3).
However, if the constitutional preemption doctrine is viewed as implied within section
301 then the constitutional analysis must be performed before the section 301 analysis
is complete. See supra note 159.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

An argument can be made, though, that no additional element
does in fact exist. If the contract, absent the SLEA, was unenforceable
as one of adhesion-as the court held Vault's contract-then there
may have been no actual element of a promise. Without a promise in
fact by the purchaser the "extra element" was lacking. The state
statute, by declaring that a promise was made and the contract is
therefore enforceable, has imposed upon the parties an element that
.was not in fact present. The statute, thus viewed, contains a mere
227
pretense of an extra element.
However, an argument can be made for the actual existence of
the extra element of a promise. Louisiana law regarding adhesion
contracts is vague and uncertain. 228 Within this environment the SLEA
may be viewed as a codification-specific only to software shrinkwrap license agreements-of the uncertain law of adhesion contracts.
A statute declaring software shrink-wrap contracts binding per se may
be viewed as implying that the legislature decided on its own that
most purchasers who open and use the software do in fact assent to
the terms of the agreement. The SLEA implies that, because of the
likelihood of consent in fact, the courts should defer policy judgments
to the legislature and hold contracts that meet the statutory requirements binding per se.
The SLEA brings itself within the scope of preemption under
section 301(a) by granting rights equivalent to those of copyright law.
However, the Louisiana SLEA is exempted from preemption under
the statute by the existence of an "extra element"-a promise on the
action. The
part of the buyer-that is not present in a copyright
229
SLEA thus withstands federal statutory preemption.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION

The Vault court stated that both the constitutional preemption
doctrine eriunciated in Sears-Compco and the statutory preemption
230
analysis stated in section 301 of the Copyright Act were applicable.
According to the constitutional preemption doctrine a state may
not pass laws that clash with the objectives of federal copyright
227. See 1 NIWMER, supra, note 129, § 1.01(B) n.46 (an obligation triggered by
a contract may be subject to federal preemption if the obligation is imposed by state
law rather than the consent of the parties to the contract).
228. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Mecom, 357 So. 2d 596, 598 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1978).
229. See supra, note 226.
230. Vault v. Quaid, 655 F. Supp. 750, 763 (E.D. La. 1987).
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laws.23 ' The SLEA involved in Vault clashes with the objectives of
federal copyright law in two ways: by keeping the programs out of
the public domain in perpetuity, and by making federal copyright
protection of software obsolete.
One of the objectives of copyright law is to encourage the
entrance of works of authorship into the public domain. 23 2 This is
achieved in the federal copyright system by the limitation of the term
of the protection. 23 3 After this term of copyright protection the work
enters the public domain and anyone may copy the work without
infringing. However, the purchasers of software protected by an SLEA
would be prohibited from copying the software for as long as they
possess it.234 Since each of the distributed software packages could be
protected by use of SLEAs the work would be prevented from ever
entering the public domain. The SLEA therefore conflicts with an
objective of the federal copyright system.
Enforcement of state SLEA's makes the federal copyright system
obsolete. 211 Since the rights granted through the SLEA are equivalent
to those under copyright, 23 6 but potentially greater in scope than
copyright, 237 a software developer would have no reason to apply for
copyright protection. All of the rights of copyright will have already
been conferred by the SLEA so no additional rights are attained by
copyright application; the rights conferred are in fact fewer through
231. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964).
232. The Constitution empowers Congress to pass laws "to promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8 (emphasis added). Copyright protection is afforded for the life of the author
plus fifty years or for 75 years in the case of an institution. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (b)
(1982). The limited term of protection is evidence itself that entrance of works into
the public domain after expiration of the term is an objective of the federal system.
Cf. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933) (expiration of
the patent term allows the invention to enter the public domain so that the public
can use it without restriction).
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1982).
234. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 29, para. 804 (1986); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
51:1964 (West 1987).
235. In considering whether state laws were preempted by the federal intellectual
property system, the Supreme Court has considered whether the state law deters the
public from application for federal protection. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.
416 U.S. 470 (1974) (state trade secrets law did not deter applicants to patent system);
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (non-preempted stateenforced contract did not deter application for patent protection).
236. See supra text accompanying note 203.
237. See supra text accompanying note 207.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

copyright than through state SLEAs. The enforcement of SLEAs thus
clashes with the objectives of federal copyright since the copyright
system will not be used by the software developers.
It has been said that a contract does not confer a monopoly upon
a party since the contract is only enforceable between the parties
consenting to the contract. 238 However, contracts of the type involved
in Vault that are employed on each and every copy of a program sold
to the consuming public effectively grant a monopoly quite similar to
the monopoly granted under the federal copyright system. Through
the workings of the state SLEA a developer can place restrictions on
the rights of the consumer to copy239 and reverse engineer ° the
software. Since the developer may place such contractual restrictions
on each copy of the program the public purchases, the developer can
enforce the restrictions against the entire consuming public. When
contracts are utilized in this comprehensive manner a monopoly is
effectively granted on the rights to copy the program.
The cases holding that a contract does not grant a monopoly and
does not clash with the objectives of federal intellectual property
law24 are distinguishable from the cases involved in state SLEAs. The
former generally involve contracts between an inventor or author and
a manufacturer or publisher, respectively. Those license contracts
contemplate an invention or original work being distributed to the
buying public and, once in distribution, being protected solely by the
federal intellectual property system. Such contracts are necessary to
achieving the goal of wide dissemination of the work since they
actually facilitate distribution.2 2 The contracts given enforcement by
SLEAs are not between author and manufacturer/distributor. Rather,
they are between the manufacturer and each buyer. This distinction
is critical. While the former facilitates distribution of ideas and
contemplates proprietary protection from the consuming public through
the federal intellectual property system, the latter effectively creates a
monopoly of rights greater in scope than those of copyright, thus
supplanting the federal system.
For the foregoing reasons the objectives of the federal copyright
system are frustrated by the enforcement of state SLEAs. Therefore,
the SLEAs are constitutionally preempted by federal law and the
238. See Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
239. See supra note 109.
240. See supra note 110.
241. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), Smith
v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
242. See Aronson, supra note 154, at 263.
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contracts that depend on SLEAs for enforcement-such as the contract in Vault-can not be enforced.
V.

CONCLUSION

The computer software industry is a major, growing American
market. Members of the industry have sought to protect their substantial investment in the development of this software through the
application of legal protection. These legal protections have been
inadequate in preventing unauthorized copying-pirating-of computer programs. The industry thus turned to extra-intellectual-property
means of protecting its proprietary interests by including shrink-wrap
license agreements on the software packaging. State legislators realized
the need for supplemental protection and enacted Software License
Enforcement Acts (SLEAs). The use of shrink-wrap agreements together with the use of protective software would reduce a large portion
of the current unauthorized copying. But the SLEA which gives
enforcement to the shrink-wrap license agreement has been held
invalid by the Vault court.
The SLEA was within the scope of the statutory preemption
doctrine of section 301(a) but was exempted from preemption by the
language of section 301(b)(3). However, the constitutional preemption
doctrine mandated that because the SLEAs clashed with the objectives
of the federal copyright system they are preempted. The court in
Vault correctly denied enforcement of the contract. Thus, a state
scheme of laws that would help reduce unauthorized copying of
software cannot be enforced because it clashes with the operation of
the federal copyright system.
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